operation as political centres. That said, we must keep in mind that the terminology of our sources is not separate from the social and political world to which it refers. 21 I propose therefore to interpret the labels attached to particular places as arguments about the political significance of those places -as constituting rather than simply revealing their character. The word "palatium" both clings to specific places and points outwards to contemporary conceptions of the realm -by following it like a trail of breadcrumbs 17 As demonstrated by Zotz, "Symbole der Königsmacht". 18 through the forests of early tenth-century history, we can observe changes in the symbols of political order and perceptions of political geography. 22 The dwindling attribution of the term "palatium" to royal residences is observable in all three of the major regions of the old empire -west Francia, east Francia and Italy.
In west Francia, the term, though common enough up until the end of the Empire, barely appears in royal charters between the reign of the first non-Carolingian king Odo (888-898) and that of the last genuinely powerful Carolingian Lothar (954-86). The one very striking exception is the reign of Charles III "the Simple" (or Straightforward) (899-923), during which the term was used frequently, even aggressively. Nine residences are labelled "palatium" by Charles's scribes, most frequently Compiègne, which is so called no fewer than twenty-one times. This serves to throw the general trend into even sharper focus: of Charles's four successors, only the chancery of his son Louis IV (936-54) used the label at all, and then only twice (once for Compiègne, once for Rheims). In Italy, the term went from being commonly used under Lothar (840-55) and Louis II (855-75), to being extremely scarce during the first half of the tenth century, and applied to a much restricted group of residences -for about twenty years after 885, not even the main royal centre of Pavia was distinguished with the category of "palatium". 23 And in the eastern kingdom, ruled from 919 by the Ottonian family, palatial status was reserved above all for key sites in the far west of the realm, that is Lotharingia, Alsace and the middle Rhine valley. By the end of the tenth century, only Aachen and Ingelheim had been given the title with anything approaching consistency, followed by Frankfurt, Cologne and Erstein -all five lie on or west of the Rhine. 24 This pattern has been described before, but not fully explained. Zotz recognised this in an excellent discussion of the Ottonian evidence and convincingly argued that palatial vocabulary, redolent of Carolingian tradition, was deployed to enhance particular acts of royal self-representation. 25 But the pattern as a whole has generally been seen as the product of a long-term process by which royal office itself became institutionalised, or transpersonalised. suggests that competing definitions of the palace and its relationship to the kingdom always co-existed, finding expression and meaning in particular political situations. This in turn calls into question the idea that the transpersonalisation of royal office, and of the palace, was a continuous and evolutionary process: the royalness of royal palaces was a recurring contemporary debate, not an independent variable which we can isolate and measure. 30 We need to look more closely at the tenth-century evidence and ask what was specific about the circumstances that produced it, rather than invoking the explanatory power of a spectral historical process.
Perhaps the most obvious, and important, point to be made about the pattern of the evidence is that almost all the sites which retained the label palatium in the first half of the tenth century were closely associated with the ninth-century Carolingian dynasty, and especially with those rulers whose legacy was most keenly felt in the successor the notion of crown property was itself not clearly institutionalised. Instead, they needed to assert their claims to these resources and the territories in which they lay, and this
gives us an alternative way to understand the use of the label "palatium" in this periodas representing an argument (performed live to local audiences and fossilised in our documents) that these residences, which were symbolically important but lay in territories on the fringes of rulers' power, were inherently royal and should thus be associated with the king, as it were ex officio. Behind them we can perhaps infer a position being taken about the inherent royalty of certain places not dissimilar to those we inferred in the minds of Louis the German in 858 and Conrad II in 1024, both of whom were at those moments attempting -like the early Ottonians -to take control of territories where they were unsure of recognition. In the context of a fluid and competitive dynastic situation these labels, and the political performances that produced them, can therefore be read as assertions of continuity and stability, rather than as evidence of continuity itself. Here, in other words, we might do better to think of institutionalisation as an argument -and as an unintended consequence of political insecurity -rather than a process.
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Another distinctive feature of the immediately post-Carolingian world is the tendency of royal palaces to pass into the hands of queens. Perhaps the best-known example of this is the Saxon royal centre at Magdeburg, Otto I's favourite residence, which was established on the dower property of his first wife Edith. 37 Already in 907
Charles the Simple had given to his wife Frederun two old Carolingian palaces, Ponthion Recycling Carolingian palatial traditions was not a straightforward business for nonCarolingian kings, because such traditions were not simply found hanging in the airthey had to be located, and performed, in particular places. ninth century -how can such discontinuities be incorporated into our understanding of the palace's history? First we will look briefly at how Aachen was thought about; and then how it was used.
The meaning of places is constructed not just through classification, but also by the stories told about them. 53 Such narratives as we have underline the sense that the late ninth century witnessed a rupture in Aachen's history of centrality, and that contemporaries recognised this rupture as such. The real turning point was a Viking raid in 881, in the course of which the attackers sacked and burned the great palace and (according to an annalist writing in Mainz) "used the king's chapel as a stable for their horses." 54 The significance of this attack should not be underestimated, for Aachen more or less drops out of our narrative sources after this point. 55 56 Connoisseurs of Einhard, among whom we may number our annalist, could have read the reference to the stabling of enemy horses in Charlemagne's chapel as a belated consummation of this threat. 57 Certainly, there are hints that this was the way it was understood by Notker of St-Gall, who collapsed together details from the careers of the two Godafrids to suggest that the same man who had boasted about destroying Aachen had also been active in the vicinity of the palace, even though the historical Godafrid I had never been near the region. 58 Elsewhere in his control of these rulers. The limits of Charles the Simple's influence, for example, is clear kingdoms in an imaginary network. 70 Aachen was the generator at its heart, its charisma drawn on through invocation or association even though it was rarely visited, far less used as a seat of government.
The fact that Aachen in the decades around 900 was simultaneously central (symbolically) and peripheral (practically) means that it was not a straightforward matter for the Ottonians to assume its control. The break in its history in the late ninth century, which was perceived by contemporaries, meant that it was not simply sitting there waiting to be inherited by the next royal dynasty that managed to establish itself, and its place in the political geography of post-Carolingian Europe was necessarily altered.
Although the palace is generally seen as one of the three main centres of the early Ottonian Reich, in fact the first two Saxon kings went there comparatively rarely: Henry I
and Otto I visited Aachen only nine times in total between 925 and 973, with the average time spent there on each occasion being surprisingly short (barely more than in the areas categorised by Müller-Mertens as "transit zones"). 71 Nor were these visits regularly spaced: six of the nine visits took place in the period 944-51, with the others falling in 930, 936 and 966. 72 What is more, when Otto was there he only issued charters for Lotharingian recipients, which suggests that in his reign Aachen was closely linked to regulation of the region in which it lay rather than a nodal point from which the whole kingdom could be ruled.
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Far from demonstrating "how firmly Lotharingia was integrated into the east Frankish realm under Otto I", I think the explanation for this pattern of visits to Aachen lies in the problems he had in asserting his control of the region in the face of opposition from rivals to the west. 74 The timing of the first two visits suggests that they were was shaped at least as much by the tenth-century cold war for northern Lotharingia during which the palace's symbolic meaning was insisted upon by kings seeking a rhetorical toehold to help them cling onto their fragile grip on the region. The symbolism of the place was kept alive and cranked up precisely because it was competed over by kings who were unable to control it. Post-Carolingian kings needed to classify such places, to constantly recreate and reappropriate their royalness, in order to possess them and to stop their "sacredness" succumbing to mundanity. 84 Not just as a metonym for the kingdom, but also as a quality of place, the concept of palace-ness was an idea that had to be actively renewed if it was to remain relevant to the political geography of the realm.
Comparing the Ottonian itinerary
One reason that early medieval rulers were so keen to lay claim to the permanence of royal palaces like Aachen was that kings themselves had to move around so much. 85 If visiting Aachen can be seen not so much as a routine part of the pre-973 itinerary as a means by which Otto I asserted his right to control territory and tradition -if, in other words, it was as much an argument about political geography as a reflection of it -then we should ask whether this has any implications for the notion of the royal itinerary itself.
The extent to which the meaning of particular sites influenced the movement of kings is sometimes left to one side in discussions of the royal progress, flattened by the seeming precision of categories such as "heartland", "periphery" and "transit zone". The itinerary is itself regarded as an institution by historians, and indeed as the unmistakeable fingerprint of Ottonian government, distinguishing it from its Carolingian predecessor and from other contemporary polities. The most influential judgement here is that of Karl Leyser, whose great 1981 essay on Ottonian government describes the itinerary as the dynasty's "most essential and carefully administered institution." 86 The institution-ness of the royal itinerary is now more or less taken for granted, and has recently been reified even further by attempts to transplant the Leyserian model of tenth-century Germany to late Anglo-Saxon England. 87 Such is the centrality of the concept of itinerant kingship to current views of the tenth century that the term is often used as shorthand for a type of kingdom in which governmental institutions were weak and power was personal, and treated as inseparable from other political phenomena like the royal feast, hunt and assembly. 88 Byzantium, dominated by the city of Constantinople, would certainly validate the contrast, and shows it to be broadly useful. But we must remember that the emphatically metropolitan context of Byzantine court politics was very unusual in the Middle Ages and should not be taken as representative of capital-based government. 96 Here, then, I
would like to play devil's advocate by holding up some aspects of the representation of rulership in the Caliphate as a mirror to the dominant conception of the Ottonian itinerary as a distinctive institution.
It goes without saying that the Caliphate and the Reich were radically dissimilar in many ways, and comparing the movement of rulers in each highlights some obvious differences. For a start the Caliphate was much more urbanised and administratively centralised. There was also the matter of climate: patterns of movement in the Middle
East were much more likely to be influenced by seasonal or environmental factors. And although palaces were sometimes associated with mosques, there is no equivalent in the Caliphate to the Ottonians' relationship with monasteries and other ecclesiastical institutions that they used for hospitality and to control strategic routes. 97 This distinction translated into the representation of rulership: whereas Western rulers were idealised as builders of churches, their counterparts in the Muslim world were flattered as founders of cities; and while Carolingian and Ottonian rulers often appropriated the palaces of their predecessors, caliphs were more usually credited with constructing their own residences from scratch, albeit often near to existing centres. 98 The difference in representation reflects the much greater wealth of the Umayyad and Abbasid elites compared to those of the West. But it also reminds us of the different historiographical traditions of the two cultures: historians in the tenth-century West, unlike those in the Middle East, were more likely to be religious professionals.
Given the fact that our European sources were often written by churchmen (and women) with direct experience of supporting the king as he moved through their area, it is perhaps surprising that they rarely identified the royal itinerary as such. Although numerous chronicles, letters and charters provide information on the logistical infrastructure which underpinned the travels of the royal court and allow us to infer the patterns of movement that helped shape early medieval political life, they do not explicitly identify the itinerary as an institution in itself. The expression iter regis, which is commonly used by historians as if it were a technical term for the institution of the itinerary, is actually vanishingly rare in the sources. 99 By contrast, rulers' itineraries are identified as specific institutions in other cultures, such as fourteenth-century Java whence we have a poem describing a royal progress which reifies the movement of the king to such an extent that the author states that "the whole of Java is to be as the capital of the king's realm." 100 Closer to home, Tabari In these two instances we do not see the capitals of the Caliphate acting as practical centres of rulership, for at these moments the rulers in question were permanently absent from them. But the cities nonetheless remained vital as stages for acts of symbolic communication by which rulers asserted their legitimacy and authority -in other words their very right to be regarded as rulers. They may have been administrative centres, but the pull they exerted was symbolic as well as bureaucratic. These Caliphs' need to advertise their association with such centres lay partly in the fact that their grasp on them was weak -the pattern of his earlier career meant that Walid II had little support in Damascus, and although the real reasons for Harun's move to Syria are not clear, some whose political meanings made them all-encompassingly significant but which in terms of political geography could sometimes become peripheral, so that even when they could not be used as seats of rule, rulers had to somehow possess them. Narratives and traditions clung doggedly to particular locations, often outlasting the specific political configurations that had given rise to them in the first place. The patterns of movement that we see here, and in post-Carolingian Europe, were shaped not just by governmental practicalities, nor by the internal institutional logic of royal itineracy, but also by the meanings of places and, in aggregate, the "representative landscape" of the realm. 110 The comparison is in many ways superficial: Harun and Walid were not typical Caliphs; post-Carolingian kings did not control an administrative structure based at particular locations; and rebranding the Abbasids as itinerant rulers would hardly be accurate. But probing the supposed opposition itinerary / capital helps remind us that just as the Caliphate was not simply a rigidly-defined structure of capitals and provinces, the Ottonian kingdom need not only have existed within the spotlight that followed the king round his kingdom. The concept of "itinerant kingship" as shorthand for a kind of polity based on features such as the ruler's presence, ritualised solemnities, hunting and feasting is not as useful as it seems because such features were also crucial to the conduct of politics in much more bureaucratised systems like the Caliphate. The image of the relentlessly mobile Ottonian king, moving from place to place and scattering Weberian charisma behind him like the tail of a comet, is perhaps not quite so singular: the conceptual opposition between a single static centre and a forever mobile royal court obscures what these polities had in common. 111 The contrast of types remains useful, especially were we to compare purer examples of itinerant kingships such as Geertz's Java with more emphatically metropolitan empires such as Byzantium. But in between we see a spectrum of polycentric realms whose centres had a range of shifting meanings which affected the way rulers interacted with them. Itineracy was less a coherent system of rule, drifting free of institutional moorings in a swamp of statelessness, than a habit of movements between highly symbolic but immobile centres -the destination mattered more than the journey.
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Conclusion
This article has hardly provided a comprehensive account of perceptions of the palace after 888, nor (given the primary focus on east Francia / Lotharingia) should its claims be thought necessarily to apply equally across all parts of the former empire. But because they helped articulate the notion of Carolingian order, focus on palaces does at least show us a corner of a bigger picture, and illuminates some of the texture of post-888 politics.
Although 888 was a before-and-after moment in the "patterned mess" of history, debates about change and continuity are not really adequate to describe the nature of the transition. Rather, it was something that was dynamically and accidentally created by the competition for power and legitimacy which took place in the five or six decades after 888.
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